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ABSTRACT:
Shareholder democracy—efforts to increase shareholder power within
the corporation—appears to have come of age, both within the United States
and abroad. In the past few years, U.S. shareholders have worked to
strengthen their voice within the corporation by seeking to remove perceived
impediments to their voting authority. These impediments include classified
boards, the plurality standard for board elections, and the inability to
nominate directors on the corporation’s ballot. Shareholders’ efforts have also
extended to seeking a voice on the compensation of corporate officers and
directors. Advocates of shareholder democracy believe that such efforts are
critical to buttressing shareholder value and curbing managerial abuses of
authority. However, there are many who criticize shareholder democracy,
claiming that it will undermine firm value and corporate governance.
Opponents also insist that shareholder democracy will undermine corporate
efforts to focus on non-shareholder constituents such as employees,
customers, and communities. This Article examines these and other criticisms
in the context of international efforts to increase shareholder democracy, and
argues that the international experience with shareholder democracy
undercuts the force of such critiques. Indeed, experiences in other countries
suggest that shareholder democracy can achieve its desired result of
enhancing financial returns and reducing corporate misconduct. In this way,
the Article relies on international corporate governance trends to provide a
novel, significant perspective to the ongoing debate over the propriety of
shareholder democracy in the United States.
INTRODUCTION:

I

N the past few years, shareholders in the United States have engaged in an
aggressive effort to enhance their voting power and authority in the
corporation. Their quest for what some have characterized as “shareholder
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democracy” has encompassed a variety of different issues. Probably the most
high-profile issue has been shareholders’ efforts to convince corporations to
adopt a majority vote standard for the election of directors.1 Other issues
include campaigns to abolish classified boards for directors as well as efforts
to gain access to the corporation’s proxy statement in order to nominate
directors.2 Shareholders have also mounted campaigns aimed at securing
advisory votes on executive compensation, known as “say on pay.”3
In many circumstances, these efforts have yielded positive results. Thus, a
significant number of corporations have acceded to shareholder demands to
institute a majority vote standard and make other changes to their corporate
governance standards.4 Moreover, legislatures have responded to
shareholders’ efforts by amending corporate governance rules in a manner
that accommodates shareholders’ ability to have a greater voice over
corporate affairs.5
Although there are many who criticize shareholder democracy as
inadvisable and ineffective, shareholder democracy has its proponents. In his
seminal article, “The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power,” Professor
Lucian Bebchuk notably argues that increasing shareholder democracy would
improve corporate governance and enhance managerial accountability.6
Indeed, Bebchuk and others contend that augmenting shareholder power will
make directors and officers more accountable to shareholders, thereby
curbing abuses of authority and the incidence of misconduct.7 In Bebchuk’s
view, increased shareholder democracy should translate into improved
shareholder value. Other scholars and practitioners, however, are more
1.

2.
3.

4.
5.
6.
7.

See Thaddeus C. Kopinski, Investor Pressure Leads to Election Reform, INST’L S’HOLDER SERVS.,
2006 POSTSEASON REPORT 16, available at http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/2006PostSeason
ReportFINAL.pdf [hereinafter 2006 PROXY SEASON REPORT] (noting that in the 2006
proxy season shareholders submitted more proposals seeking to institute majority voting
for director elections than any other proposal).
See Subodh Mishra, Support Grows for Governance Proposals, 2006 PROXY SEASON REPORT,
supra note 1 at 19.
Kevin Drawbaugh, Soaring Executive Pay Meets Reforms, REUTERS, Mar. 9, 2007,
http://www.reuters.com/article/ousiv/idUSN2427533920070310; Tomoeh Murakami
Tse, Score One for Dissent: Aflac to Be 1st U.S. Firm to Allow Advisory Votes on Pay, WASH.
POST, Feb. 15, 2007, at D1 (noting that shareholders had submitted proposals at fifty
different companies seeking to authorize a “say on pay”).
See infra note 24 and accompanying text (noting the number of companies that have
voluntarily converted to majority vote systems).
See infra notes 25–26 and accompanying text (noting changes in Delaware law and the
Model Business Corporation Act).
See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833,
836 (2005).
See id. at 842–43.
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skeptical of the benefits of shareholder democracy. Indeed, some insist that
shareholders’ rational apathy will prevent them from exercising their new
power, making shareholder democracy relatively meaningless.8 Others
contend that shareholder democracy will not lead to increased shareholder
value or otherwise have a positive impact on the corporate bottom line.
Instead, opponents claim that shareholder democracy will not only facilitate
the ability of shareholders to advance their own special self-serving agendas,9
but also will undermine the corporation’s ability to focus on non-shareholder
constituents.10
This Article offers a new perspective on the debate regarding the
potential effectiveness of shareholder democracy. It explores the likely impact
of shareholder democracy by comparing shareholder efforts within the
United States with campaigns to increase shareholder democracy in other
countries. Indeed, the recent movement in the United States to enhance
shareholder democracy is not unique: other countries have witnessed an
increase in shareholder efforts to gain greater voice in the corporation.11 Not
only have efforts to enhance shareholder democracy increased in countries
such as Germany, Japan, and Canada, but shareholder activism also is on the
rise in those countries.12 As many of these countries already have
implemented some of the measures U.S. shareholders seek, important
comparisons can be made between the United States and these other
countries. This Article maintains that these international comparisons suggest
that shareholder democracy can have positive repercussions on share value
and corporate governance more generally.
Part I of this Article sets forth the current trend in favor of shareholder
democracy within the United States. In comparison, Part II illustrates that
trend among other countries. Part III critically evaluates shareholder
democracy through the lens of international experiences with increased
shareholder power. This evaluation reveals that critics of shareholder
democracy may have underestimated its ability to benefit the corporation.
Instead, while there are certainly drawbacks to augmented shareholder power,
this Article insists that there are also reasons to be optimistic that shareholder
8.

See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Response, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1746 (2005).
9. See Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV.
561, 575 (2006) (noting that increased shareholder power may lead to increased rentseeking behavior by shareholders); Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 8, at 1754–1755.
10. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L.
REV. 247, 304–05 (1999).
11. See discussion infra Part II.
12. Id.
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democracy may have a positive influence on the corporation and all of its
constituents.
I. SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES
This Part examines the recent rise in shareholder efforts to enhance their
voting power within U.S. corporations. This examination reveals not only that
shareholders have become more active within recent years, but also that their
activism has had an impact on corporate affairs. This Part focuses on some of
the most prominent campaigns tackled by shareholders.
A. Tyranny of the Majority Vote
The campaign for majority voting in the election of directors has become
the most high-profile aspect of shareholder efforts to increase their power
within American corporations. In the United States, the default rule in
director elections is a plurality standard.13 This means that a person will be
elected to the board of directors so long as she receives a plurality of the
votes cast, without regard to votes cast against her or withheld. Technically,
the plurality system means that a person can be elected to the board even if
shareholders cast ninety-nine percent of their votes against such a person,
because the nominee needs only one vote in her favor. Shareholders and their
proponents contend that the plurality system undermines shareholders’ ability
to impact election outcomes and hold directors accountable for their
behavior.14 In fact, shareholder efforts to alter the plurality standard were
galvanized after shareholders sought to oust directors at The Walt Disney Co.
(“Disney”).15 Disney shareholders believed that their ability to achieve success
13. Forty-four states, including Delaware, operate under a plurality vote system. See Claudia
H. Allen, STUDY OF MAJORITY VOTING IN DIRECTOR ELECTIONS, at 4–5 n.7 (2007),
available at http://www.ngelaw.com/files/upload/majority_callen_020707.pdf; DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216(3). Plurality is also the default standard under the Model Business
Corporation Act. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.28(a)(1984). By contrast, only Alaska,
Illinois, Missouri, and New Mexico mandate majority voting, while Alabama and
Pennsylvania have made majority voting the default rule. See Allen at 4–5 n.7.
14. See INST’L S’HOLDER SERVS., MAJORITY ELECTIONS: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON ISS
2006 VOTING POLICY 2, available at http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/FAQMVPolicy2006.pdf.
15. See INST’L S’HOLDER SERVS., 2004 POSTSEASON REPORT: A NEW CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE WORLD: FROM CONFRONTATION TO CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE 5, available
at http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/2004ISSPSR.pdf [hereinafter 2004 PROXY SEASON
REPORT] (describing the vote-no campaign waged to remove Chairman Michael Eisner,
which resulted in shareholders withholding forty-five percent of their votes from Eisner).
The vote-no campaign was driven by shareholders’ anger over a lucrative severance
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was severely hampered by the plurality system because that system made it
almost impossible to successfully vote a director out of office.16
This belief prompted other shareholders to seek change in the director
election system. In the proxy seasons following the Disney vote, majority
voting became a critical corporate governance issue. Hence, in 2005 and 2006,
shareholders submitted a record number of proposals requesting corporations
to alter their default rule in elections to a majority vote system.17 In fact, in
2006, majority vote proposals represented the dominant type of shareholder
proposal submitted to U.S. corporations.18 Moreover, these proposals
garnered an increasingly greater share of shareholder votes: in 2006, majority
vote proposals received an average of forty-eight percent of the shareholder
vote.19 This stands in contrast to the twelve-percent average vote that such
proposals received in 2004.20
Shareholders’ efforts have yielded impressive results. In 2004, majority
voting represented the default rule in director elections at fewer than thirty
companies,21 but by the beginning of 2007, fifty-two percent of S&P 500
companies and forty-five percent of Fortune 500 companies had adopted
some form of majority vote regime.22 Many companies have adopted a
“plurality plus” standard. Under this standard, first adopted by Pfizer Inc.,
directors who fail to receive a majority of the shareholder vote must tender
their resignations, which the company must then decide whether to accept.23
Other companies, however, have adopted a true majority vote policy,

16.
17.

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

package awarded to Michael Ovitz, who was fired after a little more than a year, but
received over $140 million in severance pay. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.,
731 A.2d 342, 352 (Del. Ch. 1998). In addition to the “vote no” campaign, the payment
spurred several lawsuits. See id.
See 2004 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 15, at 5.
See THADDEUS KOPINSKI, BANNER YEAR FOR MAJORITY ELECTIONS, available at
http://www.issproxy.com/governance/publications/2006arcived/175.jsp (revealing that
shareholders submitted a record eighty-nine majority vote proposals in 2005); 2006 Proxy
Season Report, supra note 1, at 16 (noting that more than 150 majority vote proposals were
submitted in 2006).
See 2006 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 1, at 16.
See id.
See Stephen Taub, Investors Back Shareholder Resolutions, CFO.COM, Aug. 23, 2006,
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/7826000/c_7826282.
See Brooke Masters, Proxy Measures Pushing Corporate Accountability Gain Support, WASH.
POST, June 17, 2006, at A1.
See Allen, supra note 13, at iii.
See 2006 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 1, at 16. For a discussion of Pfizer’s adoption
of plurality plus, see INST’L S’HOLDER SERVS., 2005 POSTSEASON REPORT: CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AT A CROSSROADS 10 (2005), available at http://www/issproxy.com/pdf/
2005PostSeasonReportFINAL.pdf [hereinafter 2005 PROXY SEASON REPORT].
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pursuant to which directors must receive a majority shareholder vote in order
to be elected.24 Notwithstanding the form, empirical evidence reveals that
shareholder activism has led to significant changes in the system of voting for
directors.
In addition, legislatures and other governing bodies have sought to
accommodate shareholders’ efforts to institute majority voting. For instance,
in 2005, Delaware amended its corporate code to make irrevocable any
resignation submitted as a result of the failure to receive a required percentage
of votes for reelection.25 The American Bar Association (“ABA”) also
modified the Model Business Corporation Act (“Model Act”) to provide for
such a rule.26 This new rule ensures that once a director is ousted as a result
of a failure to receive a majority vote, he cannot be reinstated. Delaware also
amended its code so that directors cannot amend or repeal bylaw
amendments adopted by shareholders specifying the votes necessary for
election of directors.27 Because many of the shareholder proposals for
majority voting are embodied in bylaw amendments, this change ensures that
directors cannot undermine shareholders’ success by altering any
amendments they have secured. Finally, the ABA amended the Model Act to
allow corporations to adopt a plurality plus standard.28 In this way, the ABA
created a blueprint for the implementation of majority voting.
All of these changes support shareholder efforts to enhance their voting
power. These changes also highlight the relative success shareholders have
experienced with regard to this issue. In fact, most analysts believe that
majority voting in some form will soon be the norm in U.S. corporations.29
B. Shareholder Access to the Ballot
Shareholder efforts to gain access to the corporation’s proxy statement or
“ballot” have also taken center stage in the last few years. At present, U.S.
federal law prohibits shareholders from using the corporation’s proxy
24. See 2006 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 1, at 16 (noting more than forty companies
that have adopted a true majority vote standard).
25. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (2007).
26. See 1984 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.07 (1984).
27. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (2007).
28. See 1984 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.22 (1984) (requiring the resignation of directors
who fail to receive a majority of shareholder votes).
29. See, e.g., Martin Lipton, SOME THOUGHTS FOR BOARDS OF DIRECTORS 5 (2007), available at
http://www.realcorporatelawyer.com/pdfs/Some%20Thoughts%20for%20Boards%20of
%20Directors%20in%202008.pdf (predicting that majority voting will become
“universal”).
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statement to nominate their own board candidates.30 Thus, if shareholders
want to nominate a director candidate, they must distribute their own proxy
statement to other shareholders. Creating and distributing proxy statements is
very expensive;31 consequently, shareholders rarely nominate their own
candidates, and rarely contest management’s candidates.32 As a result, many
scholars contend that the federal proxy rules limit shareholders’ ability to
participate in director elections, and hence undermine shareholders’ ability to
impact corporate affairs.
In recent years, shareholders have made headway in their attempts to
alter this regime. After the corporate governance scandals of 2002, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) proposed a new rule granting
shareholders the ability to nominate candidates on the corporation’s proxy
statement under limited circumstances.33 To its advocates’ dismay,
considerable resistance to the proposed rule caused the SEC to abandon
efforts to implement it.34 The Second Circuit, however, revitalized the
shareholder campaign in this area in American Federation of State, County, &
Municipal Employees v. American International Group, Inc.35 In that case,
shareholders sought to get on the corporate ballot a “shareholder access
proposal” that would allow shareholders to vote on whether shareholder
candidates for directors could appear on the corporation’s proxy statement.36
The Second Circuit held that federal law did not prohibit shareholders from
30. See 17 C.F.R. §240.14a-8(i)(8) (2007).
31. See Battling for Corporate America, ECONOMIST, Mar. 11, 2006 (explaining the cost involved
with nominating director candidates); see also Brief of Harvard Law Professors as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Appellants at 3, AFSCME v. AIG, 361 F. Supp. 2d 344 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) (noting the cost involved with waging a proxy contest).
32. Bebchuk, supra note 6, at 856 (noting that from 1996 to 2002, shareholders nominated
their own candidates for directors an average of eleven times a year).
33. Security Holder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 34-48626, 68 Fed. Reg.
60,784, (proposed Oct. 23, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240, 249, and 247)
[hereinafter Proposed Rule on Nominations] (noting that the adoption of the new rule
stemmed from concern over “corporate scandals and the accountability of corporate
directors”). Under the proposed Rule 14a-11, shareholders would be able to make use of
the corporation’s proxy materials to nominate a director upon the occurrence of either of
two triggering events: (1) when shareholders had withheld more than thirty-five percent
of their votes from at least one of the company’s nominees for director; or (2) when a
security holder or group of security holders owning more than one percent of the
company’s securities submitted a proposal that the company become subject to the
security holder nomination procedure in rule 14a-11 and the proposal received more than
fifty percent of the shareholder vote. Id. at 60, 789–90.
34. See David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, Corporate Governance Update: Proxy Access—Not
Then, Not Now, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 28, 2006, at 3.
35. See 462 F.3d 121, 123–124 (2006).
36. Id. at 123–24.
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submitting shareholder access proposals, because such proposals related to
the procedural rules governing elections generally, not a particular election or
nomination of director candidates.37 The Second Circuit then encouraged the
SEC to clarify its stance on shareholder access.38 The SEC ultimately
addressed the proxy access issue by deciding to adopt a measure that would
prevent shareholders from submitting bylaw proposals regarding election
procedures.39 However, the SEC indicated that it was open to reassessing the
issue in the 2008 proxy season.40
Thus, while shareholders have not altered the status quo in this area, they
have spurred the SEC to reconsider the issue of shareholder access to the
ballot. At the very least, shareholders have kept this issue alive, which
represents a positive development for shareholders seeking a greater voice in
corporate elections.
C. The Attack on Classified Boards
Described by one expert as the “sleeper” governance issue of 2006,41
shareholder efforts to eliminate classified boards also rose to prominence in
the last few election years. Classified or staggered boards are boards where
shareholders elect only a portion of the directors each year, generally onethird of the board. Board members do not come up for re-election every year,
and hence such members have multi-year terms. Because multi-year terms
make it difficult to replace the entire board, opponents of classified boards
argue that such boards undermine director accountability and promote board
entrenchment.42 As a result, shareholders have been pressuring corporations
for more than a decade to abolish classified boards.43
In 2005 and 2006, shareholders’ efforts in this area finally yielded results.
Indeed, in 2005, the average shareholder vote for the elimination of classified
37. Id. at 129–30.
38. See id. at 130.
39. See Shareholder Proposal Relating to the Election of Directors, 72 Fed. Reg. 70,450 (Dec.
6, 2007).
40. See Karey Wutkowski, SEC to Look Outside Ballot on Proxy Access, REUTERS, Jan. 4, 2008,
http://www.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleId=USN1741224720080104.
41. Barry B. Burr, Majority Vote Issue Draws the Most Proxies: But Declassifying Boards Has Become
2006’s “Sleeper” Issue, PENSIONS AND INV., Apr. 3, 2006, at 3 (quoting a managing director
of a Virginia-based proxy advisory company).
42. See Bebchuk, supra note 6, at 853.
43. See id. at 854. Shareholders have been submitting proposals to eliminate classified boards
since the 1990s, and the support for those proposals has steadily increased, averaging
more than fifty percent approval ratings in each year since 2000. See id. at 853–54.
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boards was sixty percent, while in 2006 the average vote reached almost sixtyseven percent.44 More importantly, while corporations failed to respond to
shareholder efforts in prior years,45 companies have recently acceded to
shareholder calls to end classified boards. Thus, by the end of 2006, a
majority of directors at S&P 500 firms were elected under a declassified board
system.46 This means that these directors will serve annual terms on the
board. As with majority voting, shareholders have experienced success in
their efforts to declassify corporate boards.
D. “Say on Pay”
Executive compensation and investors’ desire to stem its growth has
been a hot-button issue in recent years. Anecdotal evidence abounds
regarding the seemingly excessive compensation of top corporate executives.
One of the most notorious examples is the severance compensation granted
to ousted Disney president Michael Ovtiz, who received $140 million after
being employed for only fourteen months.47 Another severance package
sparking outrage was that of Home Depot CEO Robert Nardelli, who
received $210 million when he was forced to step down.48 Moreover, studies
confirm that corporate salaries have risen dramatically over the years.49 These
studies also suggest that these salaries have no clear link to executive
performance.50 For example, at Home Depot, Nardelli’s compensation
continued to rise throughout his tenure even as his company’s stock price
declined.51 Studies reveal that CEO salaries in the United States are
significantly greater than those at comparable companies in other countries.52
Because of these factors, shareholders and legislators have launched many
efforts to curb executive pay. Shareholders have submitted proposals seeking
44. 2006 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 1, at 19 (noting that in 2005, the average support
was 60.5%, while the average support reached 66.8% in 2006).
45. See Bebchuk, supra note 6, at 854 (finding that fewer than one third of the companies in
which more than fifty percent of the shareholders had voted to abolish their classified
boards had actually abolished them).
46. 2006 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 1, at 19; Masters, supra note 21, at D1.
47. See generally In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 1998).
48. Tomoeh Murakami Tse, Morgan Stanley, Bank of N.Y. Investors Reject “Say on Pay”; Activist
Shareholders Encouraged by Vote Totals, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 2007, at D1.
49. See, e.g., Randall Thomas, Explaining the International CEO Pay Gap: Board Capture or Market
Driven?, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1171, 1175–76 (2004); Lucian Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power
and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 751 (2002).
50. See Thomas, supra note 49, at 1182–83.
51. See Tse, supra note 48, at D1.
52. Thomas, supra note 49, at 1182–84.
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to link pay to performance, to elicit broader disclosures on compensation
levels, and to require shareholder approval of severance compensation
packages.53 On several occasions, the SEC has altered federal rules to require
more detailed disclosure of executive compensation, most recently in
December 2006.54
The latest attempt to curb executive compensation focuses on
encouraging corporations to allow shareholders an advisory vote on such
compensation. In the 2006 proxy season, shareholders submitted the first of
such proposals.55 The proposals received an average shareholder support of
forty-percent at seven meetings.56 One result of those proposals was that in
February 2007, Aflac Inc., the biggest seller of supplemental insurance in the
world, became the first company to voluntarily implement a “say on pay”
vote.57 During that same time period, forty-one U.S. institutional investors
joined together to file proposals at forty-four companies seeking an advisory
vote on compensation, including Coca-Cola, Home Depot, Time Warner, and
Pfizer.58 In May 2007, Blockbluster Inc. became the first company at which a
“say on pay” garnered a majority vote from shareholders.59 Finally, in April of
2007, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill that would require
corporations to grant shareholders a “say on pay.”60 The bill also enables
shareholders to vote on “golden parachute” packages that would compensate
officers who are terminated as a result of a takeover or some other unplanned
event.61 A similar bill has been introduced in the Senate.62 Hence, the “say on
53. See 2006 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 1, at 3.
54. See Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 53158-01 (Sept.
8, 2006) (to be codified at 17 CFR pts. 228, 229, 232, 239, 240, 245, 249, and 274),
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2006/33-8732a.pdf.
55. See Posting of L. Reed Walton to Risk & Governance Blog, http://blog.riskmetrics.com
(May 31, 2007). See also Tse, supra note 48, at D1 (noting that the “say on pay” vote at the
Bank of N.Y. received forty-seven percent of the shareholder vote, while the Morgan
Stanley proposal garnered thirty-seven percent of the vote).
56. See Walton, supra note 55.
57. See Tse, supra note 48, at D1. Aflac’s vote will take effect in 2009.
58. Anne M. Odell, “Say on Pay” Highlighted in Upcoming 2007 Proxy Season, SOCIAL FUND, Jan.
30, 2007, available at http://www.socialfunds.com/news/article.cgi/2216.html.
59. Moira Herbst, Blockbuster Gives Say on Pay, BUSINESSWEEK.COM, May 11, 2007,
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/may2007/db20070511_96112
2.htm?campaign_id=rss_daily. The Blockbuster proposal passed by fifty-seven percent of
the vote. Verizon became the second company to record a majority vote with 50.2% of
the vote, while Motorola was the third, recording a vote of 51.8% of shareholders in favor
of “say on pay.” Walton, supra note 55.
60. Herbst, supra note 59; Tse, supra note 48, at D1.
61. For a discussion of golden parachutes, see Richard P. Bress, Golden Parachutes: Untangling
the Ripcords, 39 STAN. L. REV. 955 (1987).
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pay” movement appears to be gathering momentum, reflecting yet another
example of shareholders’ efforts to bolster their authority within the
corporation.
As this discussion reveals, the last few years have involved aggressive
efforts by shareholders to increase their voting rights and influence over
corporate affairs. Viewed together, these efforts have yielded positive results.
While the majority-vote campaign appears to be the most successful element
of the shareholder democracy movement, shareholders have achieved gains in
other areas as well. As a result, shareholders have changed the procedural
landscape in which corporations operate in the United States.
II. SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY AROUND THE GLOBE
Recent efforts to increase shareholder voting rights are not unique to the
United States. Shareholders, as well as other institutions, have sought to
enhance their voting rights in many other countries. Part II begins with an
analysis of the majority vote in other regions to provide a point of
comparison. This Part then assesses shareholder efforts to eliminate block
voting, adopt a “one share, one vote” rule for corporations, and institute “say
on pay.” This Part concludes with a brief examination of shareholder activism
in general, to provide a more robust picture of shareholder efforts in other
countries to increase their power.
A. Majority Vote Revisited
The quest for majority voting in the United States does not have a
counterpart in most other countries, because the United States is unique in its
application of the plurality standard. Indeed, most other developed markets
already have a majority vote standard for director elections.63 While the
standards differ slightly, most countries embrace a default rule enabling
shareholders to elect directors by majority vote. In the United Kingdom, the
board appoints directors. Shareholders, however, must approve director
appointments at the next annual general meeting, and their approval must be
by a majority of shareholder votes.64 Almost all other countries that have
adopted or inherited an English-based legal system similarly have adopted a
62. See Herbst, supra note 59; Walton, supra note 55. The bill is sponsored by 2008 U.S.
presidential candidate Senator Barack Obama. Walton, supra note 55.
63. See 2006 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 1, at 18.
64. Id.; see also Alex Kay & Gary Milner-Moore, Power to the People: The Growing Influence of
Shareholder Activism, PLC CROSS-BORDER Q., Oct.–Dec. 2006, at 40.
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standard that allows shareholders to elect directors by majority vote.65 In
France, companies have either a unitary or two-tiered board structure. In
French companies with a unitary board, not only must directors (excluding
employee representatives) be elected by majority vote of the shareholders, but
any votes in abstention are counted as votes against a director’s election.66
In some countries, including the Czech Republic, Germany, Poland, and
Russia, two-tiered board systems are the norm.67 Under these systems, there is
both a supervisory board and a management board.68 Members of the
supervisory board (other than employee representatives) are elected by a
majority vote of shareholders, while the management board is comprised of
directors appointed by the supervisory board.69 Hence, when compared to
most other voting systems, the American plurality system is an anomaly. As a
result, the considerable shareholder activity related to majority voting in the
United States has not been mirrored in most other markets.
As in the United States, however, majority voting has recently emerged as
a critical governance issue in Canada.70 Thus, in the last two years,
institutional investors have mounted a campaign to alter Canada’s plurality
voting standard by working with dozens of boards to convince them to adopt
a Pfizer-like director resignation policy for those directors who fail to get a
majority vote from shareholders.71 As a result of their efforts, more than half
of Canada’s sixty largest corporations adopted a director resignation or
plurality plus policy during the 2006 proxy season.72 As of June 2007, at least
seventy-two Canadian corporations and trusts had adopted such a policy.73
Mimicking the activism in the United States, Canadian investors have not only
increased their efforts to dismantle the plurality vote rule, but many Canadian

65. PAUL LEE, MAJORITY VOTING: THE WORLDWIDE ORTHODOXY, at 1, available at
http://www.icgn.org/organisation/documents/sri/lee_document.pdf. This includes
countries such as Australia, Hong Kong, India, Singapore, and South Africa.
66. Id.; see also Kay & Milner-Moore, supra note 64, at 38.
67. See id.
68. See 2006 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 1, at 18.
69. Id.; see also Kay & Milner-Moore, supra note 64, at 38–39.
70. 2006 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 1, at 17.
71. See id. This campaign is spearheaded by the Canadian Coalition for Good Governance, an
organization comprised of forty-eight institutional investors that invest in the Canadian
market. See Canadian Coalition for Good Governance, About the Canadian Coalition for
Good Governance, http://www.ccgg.ca/about-the-ccgg/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2008).
72. See 2006 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 1, at 17.
73. See Canadian Corporation for Good Governance, Guidelines, Majority Voting,
http://www.ccgg.ca/guidelines/majority-voting/majority-voting-adoptees/ (last visited
Mar. 24, 2008).
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companies have responded by altering their governance rules to be more
compatible with a majority vote standard.
Along similar lines, shareholders in Japan have been active in their efforts
to maintain the ability to remove directors by majority vote. In Japan, like in
most other countries, shareholders can elect directors by majority vote.74
Prior to 2006, however, it took a two-thirds shareholders’ vote to remove
directors.75 In May of 2006 a new Japanese corporation law became effective
permitting the dismissal of directors by a simple majority vote.76 In response
to the law, several corporations have sought to restore the previous twothirds standard by seeking shareholder approval to amend their by-laws to
revert back to the old default rule.77 Yet Japanese investors launched efforts
to oppose such changes at all of the companies where amendments were
attempted.78 While not always successful, such efforts were notable, given the
apathy often displayed by many Japanese shareholders.79 Certainly, the change
in Japanese law reflects a change aimed at strengthening shareholder voting
power. More importantly, Japanese shareholders’ efforts to maintain such a
change indicates a sign of increased activism on the part of such investors.
B. Blocking “Share Blocking”
Shareholders in other countries have also finally managed to gain some
ground on efforts to eliminate share blocking. In many continental European
countries, including France, Italy, and the Netherlands, shareholders who
wish to vote at an annual meeting must deposit their shares several days
before the meeting.80 Such shares are then effectively blocked from trading
from the time of the deposit until the day of the meeting. This practice,
known as “share blocking,” is prohibited by American law, under which

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

See 2006 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 1, at 18.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See John Taylor, Japanese Investors Step Up Activism, Risk & Governance Blog,
http://blog.issproxy.com/2006/07/000114print.html (July 7, 2006).
79. See Douglas G. Smith, A Comparative Analysis of the Proxy Machinery in Germany, Japan and the
United States: Implications for the Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 58 U. PITT. L.
REV. 145, 171 (1995) (noting the general apathy of Japanese investors).
80. See Sofie Cools, The Real Difference in Corporate Law Between the United States and Continental
Europe: Distribution of Powers, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 697, 713 (2005); Thaddeus C. Kopinski,
2006 Preview: Continental Europe, Risk & Governance Blog, http://blog.issproxy.com/2006/
02/000021print.html (Feb. 27, 2006).
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corporations cannot block shares before a shareholders’ meeting.81 Instead,
corporations determine the eligibility of voters by establishing a record date.82
Share blocking has been characterized as a critical barrier to the exercise
of shareholder voting rights. Indeed, opponents of share blocking believe it
weakens voter turnout, particularly for foreign investors, who would rather
abstain from voting than risk giving up their liquidity.83 As one analyst notes,
share blocking serves as a powerful deterrent to voting for institutional
investors.84 Ultimately, opponents argue that by promoting lower voting
participation rates, share blocking weakens companies’ incentives to be
accountable to shareholders.85
Investors have long challenged this system. Indeed, activist investors have
for many years sought to encourage corporations to voluntarily abolish share
blocking.86 Moreover, for several years, institutional investors and corporate
governance groups have submitted proposals to the European Commission
urging it to prohibit the practice of share blocking among member states.87
Despite these efforts, the practice persisted, while the European Commission
remained silent on the issue.
Now, however, that silence has been broken. In 2005, Germany amended
its corporate law to require that German companies abolish share blocking
and transition to the adoption of a twenty-one-day record date system.88 After
several public consultations, in June 2007, the European Commission
adopted a shareholder rights directive requiring corporations to abolish the
practice of share blocking in favor of establishing a record date for voting.89
Corporations have two years to comply with the directive.90
81. See id. Under Delaware law, the board cannot block shares prior to a meeting. Instead,
Delaware law only allows the board to fix a record date. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 213
(2001).
82. See Cools, supra note 80, at 713.
83. See Kopinski, supra note 80.
84. See Karina Litvack, Standing Up Against Share Blocking, EUROPEAN PENSIONS AND
INVESTMENT NEWS, June 19, 2006, http://www.epn-magazine.com/news/fullstory.php/
aid/2207/Standing_up_against_share_blocking.html.
85. See id.
86. See id. (noting activism by many investors).
87. See id.
88. See 2006 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 1, at 40.
89. See id. at 38. On June 12, 2007, the E.U. Commission adopted the Directive on the
Exercise of Certain Rights of Shareholders in Listed Companies. See Vaughn Stewart,
European Commission Formally Adopts Shareholder Rights Directive, Risk & Governance Blog,
http://blog.issproxy.com/2007/06/european_commission_formally_a.htm (June 20, 2007).
The directive abolishes share blocking, mandates the disclosure of voting results, and sets
forth the rights of shareholders to ask questions of company officials. See id.
90. See Stewart, supra note 89; see also 2006 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 1, at 38.
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These changes are viewed as enhancing shareholders’ voting rights.
Indeed, analysts believe the abolition of share blocking will spur greater voter
participation, particularly among foreign investors.91 Moreover, these changes
exemplify the progress being made to enhance shareholder democracy in
Europe.
C. “One Share, One Vote”
Although there is considerable disagreement about its utility, investors in
various countries have encouraged corporations to adopt a “one share, one
vote” rule. One share, one vote is a principle requiring that votes be allocated
in proportion to the number of shares an investor holds. The NYSE and
other U.S. listing agencies require that companies listed on their exchange
adopt a one share, one vote rule.92 As a result, one share, one vote is the
norm in the United States. Advocates argue that the rule is not only
democratic, but represents the optimal voting structure.93 Many companies in
other countries, however, do not have such a rule in place. For example, a
recent study found that more than thirty percent of the companies included in
the FTSE Eurofirst 300 index deviate from the one share, one vote
principle.94 The countries with the most deviation include France, the
Netherlands, and Sweden.95 The deviation stems from the adoption of
various voting structures, including multiple voting rights as well as voting
rights ceilings (where there is a cap on the number of shares an investor can
vote, regardless of the number owned).96 These and other practices ensure
that investors do not get the benefit of the one share, one vote rule in many
countries around the globe.

91. See Kopinski, supra note 80.
92. In December 1994, the SEC approved rules proposed by the New York Stock Exchange,
American Stock Exchange, and National Association of Securities Dealers that established
a uniform voting standard. This new standard prohibits companies listed on the NYSE,
the AMEX, or the NASDAQ system from taking any corporate action or issuing any
stock that has the effect of disparately reducing or restricting the voting rights of existing
common stock shareholders.
93. But see Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 775
(disagreeing with the traditional view that one share, one vote is economically optimal).
94. See DEMINOR RATING, APPLICATION OF THE ONE SHARE–ONE VOTE PRINCIPLE IN
EUROPE (2005), available at http://www.deminor.com/download.do?doc=deminorratingDocs/
ABIOneShareOneVoteFullReport.pdf.
95. See id.
96. See id.
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To be sure, there is disagreement about the importance of such a rule to
shareholder rights. Indeed, one study concluded that the rule was not justified
by economic efficiency.97 Another study reached similar conclusions.98
Despite this disagreement, there has been renewed activity and focus
around the issue of one share, one vote. Investors as well as the European
Commission have pressured corporations to embrace such a rule.99 Moreover,
many companies have voluntarily adopted the rule.100 While the transition to
one share, one vote is uncertain, the increased attention on instituting such a
rule reflects another example of shareholder efforts to protect and strengthen
their voting rights in other countries.
D. “Say on Pay” Revisited
Shareholders in other countries have also zeroed in on executive
compensation. Indeed, although executive compensation has not risen as
dramatically in other countries as it has in the United States, executive salaries
around the globe have gone up in recent years.101 Moreover, investors in
other countries have expressed sharp criticism regarding the apparent lack of
connection between executive pay and company performance.102
Interestingly, as with majority voting, considerably more progress has
been made in other countries with respect to “say on pay” than in the United
States. In 2002, the United Kingdom became the first country to require a
shareholder advisory vote on board pay.103 Thus, U.K. shareholders had been
casting a non-binding vote on compensation for almost five years before
shareholders in the United States even began agitating for such a vote.
Although the vote is not binding on U.K. companies, it gives shareholders an
opportunity to express their opinion on compensation practices at their firms.
U.K. law also requires disclosure on various compensation data.104 Other
countries have followed the U.K. example. For instance, corporations in
Australia and Sweden also must allow their shareholders to cast a non-binding
vote on compensation.105 Moreover, in Australia, one company had its
97. See Guido A. Ferrarini, One Share–One Vote: A European Rule? 3–4 (Univ. of Genoa and
ECGI, Working Paper No. 58, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=875620.
98. See Martin & Partnoy, supra note 93.
99. See Ferrarini, supra note 97, at 2.
100. See id. at 5.
101. See Thomas, supra note 49, at 1174–76.
102. See id. at 1175.
103. See 2006 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 1, at 14.
104. See id.
105. See id.
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remuneration report rejected by shareholders, while reports at several other
companies received against votes as high as forty percent.106 In contrast to
those in Australia and the United Kingdom, corporations in the Netherlands
must grant their shareholders a binding vote on executive compensation.107
These shareholder votes on compensation represent part of shareholders’
ongoing struggle to curb compensation levels, and to ensure that executive
compensation is more closely linked to performance. Furthermore, they
reflect shareholders’ quest for a greater voice in corporate affairs.
E. Shareholder Activism
Shareholders around the globe have demonstrated increased activism
over the last few years, an activism that is in sharp contrast to the apathy that
many such shareholders previously exhibited.108 This activism underlines the
general push for shareholder democracy, as well as shareholders’ efforts to
have a greater role in corporate affairs.
For example, shareholders in Japan have revealed unprecedented activism
over the last few years. Indeed, studies confirm that most shareholders in
Japan traditionally tended towards significant apathy.109 This apathy was
epitomized by the fact that historically, relatively few shareholders attended
annual shareholder meetings.110 In fact, the percentage of investors present at
shareholder meetings had been decreasing steadily.111 This lack of attendance
had a significant impact on shareholders’ ability to exercise their voice within
Japanese corporations. Indeed, because of the relatively weak market for
corporate control and other non-legal factors, experts believe that shareholder
involvement at annual meetings represents one of the few ways in which
shareholders can express their discontent with Japanese companies and play
an active role in corporate governance.112
106. See id.
107. See id. at 15.
108. See Smith, supra note 79, at 178–79 (pinpointing significant shareholder apathy, particularly
in Germany and Japan).
109. See, e.g., In the Locust Position: Shareholder Activism in Japan, ECONOMIST, June 30, 2007, at 76
[hereinafter Shareholder Activism in Japan]; Smith, supra note 79, at 171 (noting that
shareholder apathy in Japan represents a “significant barrier to shareholder participation
in corporate governance”).
110. See Smith, supra note 79, at 171–72.
111. See id.; Yoichiro Taniguchi, Japan’s Company Law and the Promotion of Corporate Democracy: a
Futile Attempt?, 27 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 195, 229 (1988); Christopher Heftel, Corporate
Governance in Japan: The Position of Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporations, 5 U. HAW. L. REV.
135, 169–70 (1983).
112. See Smith, supra note 79, at 170–71.
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Shareholders’ ability to play a role in shareholder meetings has been
limited in at least two critical ways. First, the vast majority of Japanese
companies hold their annual meetings on the same day, severely limiting
activist shareholders’ ability to participate in multiple shareholder meetings.113
Second, and perhaps most problematic, the ability of shareholders to
participate in shareholder meetings is undermined by the presence of
sokaiya.114 Sokaiya are essentially corporate extortionists who attend
shareholder meetings on a company’s behalf in order to quell any shareholder
discontent and keep the meetings short—preferably under thirty minutes.115
Apparently, corporations that do not agree to hire a sokaiya are subject to
threats, intimidation, or worse.116 One study revealed that some seventy-seven
percent of Japanese corporations had admitted to paying sokaiya, even though
such payments are illegal under Japanese law.117 In fact, the rationale behind
holding shareholder meetings on the same day was to limit the ability of
sokaiya to police the bulk of such meetings.118 Despite this rationale, uniform
annual meetings and the presence of sokaiya combine to severely impede
shareholders’ ability to participate in meetings. This impediment underscores
the general apathy historically displayed by investors in Japan.
Over the past few years, however, such investors have begun actively
participating in annual meetings. Indeed, one study found that not only have
meetings run longer than the traditional thirty minutes, but there also has
been a rise in the number of shareholders attending meetings, as well as in the
number of questions being asked at the meetings.119 Moreover, shareholders
have submitted more proposals at meetings. Thus, almost thirty companies
faced shareholder resolutions in 2006, double the number facing such
resolutions in 2005.120 Some commentary suggests that this increased activism
is due to an increase in the proportion of foreign investors.121 Indeed,
foreigners currently account for some twenty-eight percent of Japanese firm
shares.122 Foreign investors’ willingness to be more involved in shareholder

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See Shareholder Activism in Japan, supra note 109.
See Smith, supra note 79, at 172; Heftel, supra note 111, at 170.
See Heftel, supra note 111, at 107.
See id.
See id.
See Shareholder Activism in Japan, supra note 109.
See Taniguchi, supra note 111, at 228–29.
See Shareholder Activism in Japan, supra note 109.
See id.
See id.
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meetings has apparently spurred Japanese shareholders to do the same.123
Given the importance of activism at shareholder meetings, the recent trend of
greater involvement suggests that shareholders in Japan are beginning to play
a greater role in corporate affairs.
Similarly, shareholders in Germany have displayed an increased level of
activism. Like their Japanese counterparts, German shareholders historically
have exhibited significant apathy.124 Some contend that this apathy stems
from the heightened role that banks play in the German proxy system relative
to other countries.125 In the last few years, however, Germany has witnessed
an astonishing rise in shareholder activism.126 Shareholder activists have
mounted campaigns challenging a variety of governance practices, and have
played a critical role in takeover battles at German companies.127 Moreover,
shareholders have been active in challenging directors and CEOs deemed to
be underperforming.128 These challenges are epitomized by shareholders’
success in ousting the head of Deutsche Börse in 2005.129 While many in
Germany bemoan the recent rise in shareholder activism, that rise reflects
shareholder efforts to gain a greater voice within German corporations.
In the United Kingdom, shareholder activism among institutional
investors also has increased. Traditional shareholder activism has been rare in
the United Kingdom.130 Recent studies, however, reveal that shareholders,
particularly institutional investors, have begun taking a more active role in
governance affairs.131 This increased activism is demonstrated by increased
investor opposition to company resolutions, which has grown steadily in
123. See id. (explaining that traditional institutional investors in Japan have taken a more active
role in Japanese governance issues alongside newer shareholder activists).
124. See Smith, supra note 79, at 186; Carter Dougherty, Deutsche Chief Looks at a Legacy of Change,
INT’L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 16, 2005 at 13 (noting that German companies had
“languished” for years without embracing shareholder activism).
125. See Smith, supra note 79, at 187.
126. See Dougherty, supra note 126; Ben McLannahan, Rebels with a Cause, CFOEUROPE.COM,
Feb. 2004, http://www.cfoeurope.com/displayStory.cfm/2383150 (describing increased
shareholder democracy as a “cultural shift” among German investors).
127. See McLannahan, supra note 127.
128. See id.; see also Kay & Milner-Moore, supra note 64, at 44.
129. See Dougherty, supra note 126.
130. See Marco Becht et al., Returns to Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Clinical Study of the
Hermes U.K. Focus Fund (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 138, 2006),
available at http://www.edebodt.net/workshop_2007/SupportFiles/ReturnToShareholder
Activism.pdf; John Hendry et al., Responsive Ownership, Shareholder Value, and the New
Shareholder Activism 8 (ESRC Centre for Bus. Res. Working Paper No. 297, 2004), available
at http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/wp297.pdf (noting that shareholder activism has not
been a widespread phenomenon in the United Kingdom).
131. See id. at 6.
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recent years.132 In addition, a 2006 study revealed that U.K. shareholders have
played an active role in replacing CEOs and board chairs, participating in
restructuring decisions, and altering investment and company policies.133 The
study noted that this high level of shareholder engagement was distinct from
previous periods, when shareholders rarely played a role in governance
matters.134 The study also found that such engagement yielded positive
returns for shareholders.135
Some of the recent activism in the United Kingdom has likely been
spurred by investors’ ability to provide an advisory vote on executive pay.
Analysts maintain that the mandatory shareholder vote has contributed to
shareholder activism by increasing the level of dialogue between investors and
company management.136 Both the required vote and increased shareholder
participation in issues of executive compensation reflect the growing levels of
shareholder democracy within the United Kingdom.
While not all of the increased activity has yielded results, experts agree
that heightened activism represents a new worldwide phenomenon. Hence,
like their U.S. counterparts, shareholders in other countries have been
pushing for a greater role in corporate affairs, and have subsequently used
that role to press for change in the corporate structure.
III. SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY THROUGH THE LENS OF
INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES
A. The Shareholder Democracy Debate in the United States
Proponents of shareholder democracy in the United States maintain that
increasing shareholder power will improve firm performance and shareholder
value.137 In their view, shareholder democracy is an important method of
ensuring that directors and officers have greater accountability. This increased
accountability, then, should translate into a decrease in the amount of fraud
and corporate misconduct. It also should translate into greater efficiency, and
hence, increased financial returns.
Opponents express skepticism about the merits of shareholder
democracy. This skepticism takes the form of four distinct, but overlapping,
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See id.
See Becht et al., supra note 130, at 14–16.
See id. at 8.
See id.
See id.
See Bebchuk, supra note 6, at 842–43.

22

Virginia Law & Business Review

3:1 (2008)

concerns. As an initial matter, opponents question whether shareholders, who
have traditionally been apathetic, will actually utilize their increased power
once it is granted. Second, opponents maintain that shareholder power will
not translate into increased shareholder returns, nor will it improve corporate
governance.138 This is because, in some scholars’ views, the current system of
centralized decision making by the board is optimal. By granting shareholders
greater power, and thus taking power from the board, shareholder democracy
threatens to undermine the efficiency and value created by American
corporations.139 Third, critics maintain that increasing shareholder democracy
will facilitate the ability of certain shareholders to advance their own personal
agendas at the expense of the overall health of the firm.140 Finally, scholars
contend that increasing shareholder power will have a detrimental impact on
non-shareholder stakeholders, undermining the corporation’s ability to pay
heed to the concerns of all corporate constituents.141 The next section
examines the validity of these arguments by drawing on insights from
experiences in other countries.
B. An International Perspective
1. Shareholder Democracy and Passivity
Professor Stephen Bainbridge and other scholars have argued that
shareholders’ natural and rational apathy may undercut the extent to which
they will use the power granted to them.142 Studies by Professor Bernard
Black and other scholars suggest that shareholders tend to be relatively
passive, failing to exercise the voting power provided to them or otherwise
engage in activism.143 This relative passivity makes it unlikely that
shareholders will benefit from increased power. Such an assessment gives
opponents of shareholder democracy comfort, while suggesting that
proponents’ efforts in this area are in vain.
On the one hand, experiences in other countries would appear to confirm
the view that shareholders’ natural apathy will limit the extent to which they
exercise any increased power they receive. For example, consider the practice
138. See Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 1749.
139. See id at 1746; Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53
UCLA L. REV. 601, 624 (2006).
140. See Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 1754.
141. See infra notes 185–188.
142. See Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 1753.
143. See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520 (1990).
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of majority voting, the norm in most modern markets outside of the United
States. Majority voting does not appear to have resulted in significant
shareholder power in countries that observe it. To the contrary, shareholders
do not appear to have used their vote to challenge directors. Thus, studies
demonstrate that instances in which shareholders challenge managers’
selections for directors are exceedingly rare.144 This is true even in
corporations that have been rocked by scandal. Moreover, this is true despite
the fact that, unlike America, most other countries make it relatively easy to
nominate alternative candidates for directors.145 To be sure, cultural and other
non-legal hurdles may explain the relative passivity of shareholders in other
countries.146 Studies suggest, however, that the crux of the problem may be
relative apathy among shareholders.147 Thus, experiences in these other
countries appear to confirm the assertion that expanding shareholder
democracy may have relatively little impact on the corporate governance
landscape. Given that majority voting represents the signature campaign in
the quest for increased shareholder democracy in the United States, these
experiences do not bode well for advocates of increased shareholder power.
On the other hand, there is some evidence to suggest that shareholders
may exercise their increased power in more subtle ways; hence, enhanced
shareholder power may in fact have a greater influence on corporate affairs
than theories about apathy would predict. Because it strengthens the impact
of a withhold-the-vote campaign, majority voting structures can serve to
enhance dialogue between shareholders and managers.148 From this
perspective, that shareholders rarely challenge manager selections may reflect
greater compromise prior to such selections. Evidence also suggests that
shareholders do exercise their authority during times of perceived crisis.
Certainly the fact that shareholders were able to oust a key German CEO
exemplifies this point. Additionally, shareholders in the United Kingdom
144. See 2006 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 1, at 18 (revealing that instances where U.K.
directors receive less than majority support are rare).
145. See, e.g., Cools, supra note 80, at 745–47; Kay & Milner-Moore, supra note 66, at 38–40
(explaining the French, German, and U.K. systems allowing for the removal of directors);
see also Shareholder Activism in Japan, supra note 109 (noting that while corporate law is more
shareholder friendly in Japan—enabling shareholders to oust the entire board without
cause—Japanese shareholders tend to defer to management).
146. See Smith, supra note 79, at 170–73, 186–89 (pinpointing extra-legal factors that hinder
shareholder activism in Germany and Japan).
147. Id. at 186 (noting that shareholder apathy is “relatively great” in both Japan and Germany).
148. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with Barbarians Inside
the Gate, 45 STAN. L. REV. 857, 866 (1993) (noting the impact that a successful withholdthe-vote campaign may have on communication).
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have been known to cast a high percentage of dissenting votes for some
directors.149 In some cases, the dissent vote reached in excess of thirty
percent, which one analyst characterized as “striking.”150 In other cases, even
when shareholders’ votes fall short of the majority needed to oust a director,
such votes lead to the removal of directors.151 A similar phenomenon
occurred in the case of Disney, where even though shareholders’ “no” votes
fell short of a majority, shareholders’ expression of dissent eventually
prompted corporate action. In this regard, the bare statistics on shareholder
voting patterns may understate the influence of shareholder voting. Here too,
the fact that shareholders exercise their power of removal or dissent only in
rare circumstances may reflect an optimal use of shareholder power. As
Professor Bebchuk notes, the purpose of enhanced shareholder power is not
to supplant managerial authority, but rather to ensure greater dialogue
between shareholders and managers while ensuring that shareholders can
exercise their voice under critical circumstances.152 In this regard, the evidence
may indicate that shareholders use their authority where appropriate.
2. Shareholder Democracy and Corporate Value
Professor Bainbridge and others also contend that shareholder
democracy and activism will not improve firm value. In fact, U.S. studies
assessing the impact of shareholder democracy and activism on firm value
have yielded mixed results. At least some studies suggest that shareholder
activism may have a positive impact on corporate governance structures.153
Other studies indicate that shareholder activism has little to no link to share
value and earnings.154 Still other studies confirm the notion that shareholder
activism has had a minimal impact on corporate performance.155 These
149. See ALAN BRETT, MANIFEST INFO. SERVS. LTD., VOTING SEASON REVIEW 2002–2003
(2003), at 33–34 (presenting a study of proxy data revealing that four directors received
dissenting votes in excess of thirty percent, while sixteen directors received dissents in
excess of twenty percent and sixty-seven received dissents in excess of ten percent).
150. Id. at 34.
151. See id.
152. See Bebchuk, supra note 6, at 876.
153. Jonathan Karpoff, The Impact of Shareholder Value on Target Companies: A Survey of Empirical
Findings 19, 26 (unpublished manuscript, 2001) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=885365.
154. See id. at 23, 26; see also Bernard Black, Shareholder Activism and Corporate Governance in the
U.S., in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (Peter Newman
ed., 1998); Stuart Gillian & Laura Starks, A Survey of Shareholder Activism: Motivation and
Empirical Evidence, CONTEMP. FIN. DIG., Autumn 1998, at 27.
155. See Roberta Romano, Less is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism
of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 174, 187–89 (2001).
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findings suggest that shareholder agitation and increased participation do not
necessarily translate into greater value for shareholders.
Interestingly, a recent study in the United Kingdom supported by the
London Business School contradicts such an assessment.156 The study found
a high correlation between enhanced firm value and shareholder activism on
the part of institutional investors.157 Authors of the study cautioned that the
results may not have broad application to other countries, particularly the
United States.158 This is because the governance mechanisms in the United
Kingdom are distinct from and in many ways more expansive than those in
the United States. Thus, scholars note that legal obstacles, including the
restricted shareholder nomination and director election process, impede the
activism of American investors.159 Moreover, scholars pinpoint the lack of
majority vote system in the United States as hampering the ability of
shareholder activism to have a positive influence on shareholder value and
returns.160 Thus, as several American scholars have noted, the governance
conditions in the United Kingdom may make that country a more favorable
environment for activism, increasing the likelihood that such activism will
have a positive impact on shareholder returns.161
At the very least, the study suggests that shareholder activism can have
favorable repercussions for shareholders under the right circumstances. Many
of the problems associated with the U.S. governance system that have made it
less ideal for effective shareholder activism, such as the majority vote system
and shareholder proxy access, are now being addressed in some fashion.
Thus, to the extent that American shareholders have begun to dismantle these
systems, the U.K. study raises the possibility that the altered U.S. corporate
governance structure—like its U.K. counterpart—may present a more
favorable environment for activism. As a result, the study also raises the
possibility that shareholder democracy can have a positive impact on share
value and earnings.

156.
157.
158.
159.

See Becht et al., supra note 130, at 3, 6–7.
See id. at 6.
See id. at 3–5.
See id. at 4–5; Black, supra note 154, at 459; Bernard Black, Shareholder Passivity Re-examined,
89 MICH. L. REV. 520 (1990).
160. See Becht et al., supra note 130, at 4–5; Cools, supra note 80, at 746–48.
161. See Becht et al., supra note 130, at 3–5; see, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 6, at 849; Bernard
Black & John Coffee, Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior under Limited Regulation, 92
MICH. L. REV. 1997, 2003 (1994).
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3. Shareholder Democracy and Corporate Affairs
Some have maintained that increasing shareholder power may have little
impact on corporate affairs. In fact, previous studies suggest that increasing
shareholder power may not lead to greater accountability or otherwise rectify
corporate governance failures. In other contexts, scholars have pointed out
that shareholder activism through the shareholder proposal process
represents an ineffective mechanism for altering corporate practices,
particularly practices involving executive compensation schemes.162 Thus, it is
not clear that increasing shareholder power will prove effective.
At first, experiences in other countries appear to confirm the notion that
increased shareholder power will do little to prevent corporate misconduct.
Indeed, shareholders in other countries not only operate under a majority
vote regime, but also have an expanded ability to remove directors from
office.163 This ability did not have an appreciable impact on preventing
corporate misconduct. Instead, similar to the United States, those countries
experienced several instances of corporate mismanagement and fraud.
Proponents of majority voting have argued that a majority vote standard
would increase accountability, because shareholders would have the actual
ability to prevent directors from serving on the board.164 This ability would
serve as a powerful threat, and hence a powerful deterrent.165 The fact that
the majority vote regime did not appear to have such an impact in other
countries, however, suggests that the threat of removal in a majority vote
regime does not quell director misconduct or make directors more
accountable.
Yet the United Kingdom’s experience with executive compensation
suggests that, in some contexts, increased shareholder power may have an
impact on corporate affairs. Indeed, in 2002 the United Kingdom became the
first country to require that shareholders be given an advisory vote on board
pay.166 Such a vote has apparently led to more significant dialogue between
shareholders and managers on issues of compensation. Moreover, the vote
apparently has had an impact on compensation levels. Thus, a recent study
162. See Lori B. Morino, Executive Compensation and the Misplaced Emphasis on Increasing Shareholder
Access to the Proxy, 147 U. PENN. L. REV. 1205, 1236–37, 1246 (1999) (noting that executive
compensation continues to rise, notwithstanding shareholders’ increased ability to submit
proposals related to such compensation).
163. See Cools, supra note 78, at 746.
164. See Masters, supra note 21.
165. See id.
166. See 2006 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 1, at 14.
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revealed that the compensation of top U.K. executives rose between five and
six percent in 2006.167 This increase is remarkable because for the past five
years such compensation levels had increased an average of fourteen percent
per year.168 This change suggests that shareholders’ enhanced authority within
the corporation has had an impact on corporate affairs. In fact, many
advocates of advisory votes on compensation in the United States pinpoint
the United Kingdom’s experience as an example of the positive impact such a
vote can have on excessive compensation.169 The fact that shareholder
activism in the United Kingdom has had an impact on executive
compensation is important given that the issue of compensation is one of the
principle impetus for the rise in shareholder activism in the United States.
From this perspective, the U.K. experience, at least with regard to
compensation, supports the notion that shareholder democracy can influence
corporate affairs.
4. Shareholder Democracy and Special Interest Governance
Several scholars have expressed concern over the possibility that granting
shareholders enhanced power will give certain investors a greater ability to
advance special interests at the expense of the corporation as a whole. These
critics argue that the diversity of shareholders as a collective means that they
will not share common interests, and thus shifting power to them would
encourage rent seeking and reduce shareholder value.170 In fact, both
Professor Bainbridge and Vice Chancellor Leo Strine of the Delaware Court
of Chancery question whether shareholders, if given enhanced power, will act
in the best interests of the firm or will advance their own narrow selfinterests.171
The most active shareholders of a company are often among the most
susceptible to outside influences. Professor Roberta Romano points out that
public pension funds face intense political pressure to focus on narrow

167. See id.
168. See id.
169. See H.R.1257, 110th Cong. (2007), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/speech/
financialsvcs_dem/muhr1257032107.pdf.
170. See Anabtawi, supra note 9, at 575.
171. See Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 1754; Leo Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A
Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV.
1759, 1771 (2006).
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personal and social issues.172 Other scholars similarly pinpoint the tendency of
investors such as public pensions and labor unions to pursue their own
interests without regard to how they impact the corporation as a whole.173 For
example, some evidence suggests that labor unions initiate shareholder
proposals after failed talks with management.174 In this regard, many
opponents contend that increasing shareholder power will only augment the
ability of certain investors to advance their narrow political or personal goals.
Moreover, the type of investors on the forefront of the movement to
increase shareholder power both in the United States and abroad seem to
validate this concern. Specifically, in the United States, hedge funds have been
very active in the new campaign for shareholder democracy.175 Here, too,
hedge funds have played an increasingly greater role in other countries,
galvanizing shareholder activism.176 Hedge funds tend to have greater success
than traditional shareholders because they have greater resources, financial
innovation, and flexibility.177 Additionally, hedge funds often couple their
voting campaign with a threat of a proxy contests for corporate control.178
This threat dramatically increases their bargaining power. Yet hedge funds
often have narrow agendas that do not take into account the interests of the
corporation as a whole. Hence, the presence and prominence of hedge funds
in the campaign for shareholder democracy supports the notion that such
democracy will not have a positive impact on the corporation as a whole.
The involvement of other investors in the new movement for
shareholder democracy, however, may mitigate the problem of hedge fund
activism. In the United States, institutional investors as well as pension funds
also have played a major role in the new efforts to advance shareholder
rights.179 Similarly, many scholars have observed that the recent activism in
other countries stems not only from hedge funds, but also from institutional
investors. For instance, institutional investors in Germany have played a role
172. See Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93
COLUM. L. REV. 795, 811–812 (1993) (noting the distinction between public and private
funds and the pressure public funds face to focus on local and social issues).
173. See Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Gap Filling, Hedge Funds, and Financial Innovation 5,
(Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper No. 06-21, 2006) available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=931254.
174. See id. at 14.
175. See Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 173, at 22. For a definition of hedge funds, see id. at 23.
176. See Shareholder Activism in Japan, supra note 109.
177. See Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 173, at 22.
178. See id. at 173, at 49.
179. See 2006 PROXY REPORT, supra note 1, at 5, 10 (noting institutional investor and pension
support for majority vote proposals).
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in the recent wave of activism there.180 Such investors have been focused on
improving corporate governance. Thus, much of their activism has revolved
around governance matters that impact all shareholders, such as CEO pay,
dividends, and corporate governance codes.181 From this perspective, the
presence of other investors in the new push for shareholder democracy
suggests that broad corporate concerns, as opposed to narrow special
interests, may continue to be prominent. While this does not negate the
potential for special interests governance, it does undermine the notion that
increased shareholder power will inevitably lead to such governance.
Moreover, as Professor Bebchuk has suggested, investors who seek to
advance their own self-interest are not likely to gain the support of other
shareholders that may be necessary to capture the attention of corporate
managers.182 Such support is not likely to be forthcoming if an investor seeks to
advance a narrow agenda.183 Instead, investors will embrace issues that
enhance the overall health of the corporation, or those that a broad range of
shareholders otherwise find important.184 This suggests that shareholder
democracy may be able to weed out all but the most value-enhancing
initiatives, undercutting shareholders’ ability to advance personal agendas.
5. Shareholders vs. Stakeholders?
Another criticism of shareholder democracy has been that it will have a
negative impact on the ability of corporations to focus on groups other than
shareholders and issues beyond short-term profits.185 Scholars such as
Professors Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout have emphasized the importance of
the board’s role in mediating the interests of the many constituents within the
corporation.186 Critics contend that if shareholder activism shifts power away
180. See McLannahan, supra note 126.
181. See id.
182. See Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 173, at 14–15; Stewart Schwab & Randall S. Thomas,
Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018,
1035–36, 1082–83 (1998) (noting that labor initiatives cannot succeed without the support
of other shareholders, which support will not emerge unless they relate to issues that have
the potential to improve corporate performance); Battling for Corporate America, supra note
31, at 63 (noting that “politically motivated shareholders and hedge funds are likely to gain
any real power over management only if they can persuade the usual passive majority to
support them”).
183. See id.
184. See Schwab & Thomas, supra note 184, at 1041–42.
185. See Bebchuk, supra note 6, at 912.
186. See Blair & Stout, supra note 10, at 253–54, 286; John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson,
Corporate Cooperation, Relationship Management, and the Trialogical Imperative for Corporate Law,
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from the board, it will prevent the board from focusing on these other
issues.187 Moreover, it will ensure that the corporation only addresses issues
associated with profit-making.188
It is certainly plausible that increased shareholder power will translate into
less attention to the concerns of other stakeholders. As noted above, hedge
funds have been on the forefront of the push for shareholder power. Hedge
funds’ primary objective, however, appears to be short-term financial gain,
and such funds do not appear concerned with the interests of other
constituents.189 Activism in other countries also seems to run counter to
stakeholder interests. In Japan, for example, much of the activism is aimed at
facilitating takeovers.190 Such takeovers can have a negative impact on
stakeholders, leading to lost jobs for employees, diminished credit, and
displacement of stores and plants to the detriment of customers and the
broader community. Bebchuk points out that “game-ending”191 decisions, like
those involving a takeover, benefit shareholders and yet often have negative
ramifications for stakeholders.192 Shareholders motivated by such decisions
are therefore likely to take actions that negatively impact other corporate
constituents.

187.
188.

189.

190.

191.
192.

78 MINN. L. REV. 1443, 1446 (1994) (describing the board as a mediator for various
constituent concerns).
See Blair & Stout, supra note 10, at 253–54, 286.
See Bebchuk, supra note 6, at 908; Blair & Stout, supra note 10, at 304–05; Lynn Stout &
Iman Anabtawi, Sometimes Democracy Isn’t Desirable, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2004 at B2
(noting that boards mediate conflicts among shareholders and other corporate
constituents, and ensure that corporate policy “will not be set by an anonymous, myopic,
return-hungry pack of shareholders”). But see Stephen Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The
Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 593–605 (2003) (advancing
arguments against the conception of the board as a mediator); David Millon, New Game
Plan or Business as Usual?: A Critique of the Team Production Model of Corporate Law, 86 VA. L.
REV. 1001, 1024–42 (2000) (stating that corporate law does not reflect the idea of the
board as a mediator).
See Anabtawi, supra note 9, at 580; K.A.D. Camara, Classifying Instituional Investors, 30 J.
CORP. L. 219, 239 (2005). But see Larry E. Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility in
Corporate Governance, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1431, 1445 (2006) (noting that “even the
most narrowly focused shareholders” are concerned about other constituents, because by
advancing the concerns of such constituents, the corporation can avoid litigation and
other costs associated with inflicting social harms).
See 2006 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 1, at 43 (noting that shareholder activism has
been spurred by the flurry of poison pills being introduced by Japanese firms). See also
Shareholder Activism in Japan, supra note 109 (noting that much activism is focused on
unwinding poison pill measures).
Game-ending decisions encompass decisions to merge, sell all the corporate assets, or
dissolve. See Bebchuk, supra note 6, at 837.
See id. at 910.

3:1 (2008)

Shareholder Democracy on Trial

31

In many cases, however, the interests of shareholders and stakeholders
converge. Indeed, many scholars recently have emphasized the notion that
shareholders constitute a diverse group with different agendas.193 Often these
agendas dovetail with the interests of stakeholders. Thus, some shareholders
invest with a view towards the long-term, which means that they have an
interest in advancing concerns beyond immediate financial gain.194 Indeed,
these long-term investors encourage a focus on other constituents because
they believe that such constituents are important to maintaining the overall
health of the corporation.
More specifically, of course, many shareholders have investment goals
that include supporting other constituents and broader social policies. In the
United States, these so-called “social investors” include faith-based
organizations, pension funds, and socially responsible investment funds.195 In
other countries, such as the United Kingdom, institutional investors have led
the way in pressuring corporations to behave in socially acceptable ways.196
Moreover, some shareholders are also stakeholders. Nowhere is this more
evident than in countries like Germany and France, where employee
stakeholders elect representatives to the board. In the United States, the most
obvious example of this phenomenon is union pension funds, which are
comprised of employees and hence presumably seek to advance the interests
of employees.197 The fact that some shareholders are also stakeholders
193. See, e.g., Anabtawi, supra note 9, at 564 (noting the various and conflicting interests among
shareholders); K.A.D. Camara, Classifying Institutional Investors, 30 J. CORP. L. 219, 229–42
(2005) (discussing different investors and their divergent concerns); Stout & Anabtawi,
supra note 188 (noting that many suffer from the mistaken assumption that shareholders
in public companies have a single shared interests).
194. See Ribstein, supra note 189, at 1459 (“A firm’s long-run profits may depend significantly
on satisfying the social demands of consumers, employees and local communities.”);
Anabtawi, supra note 9, at 579–80; Matheson & Olson, supra note 186, at 1487 (noting that
long-term shareholders understand that a corporation’s sustained growth depends on
focusing on other stakeholders).
195. See Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, Is there an Emerging Fiduciary Duty to Consider
Human Rights?, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 75, 95–96 (2005); Lynn Stout, Takeovers in the Ivory Tower:
How Academics Are Learning Martin Lipton May Be Right, 60 BUS. LAW. 1435, 1449 (2005)
(discussing the social shareholder).
196. While social activism is generally confined to particular investors within the United States,
in other countries there appears to be a broader level of shareholder support for social
issues. In fact, mainstream investors in the United Kingdom have led the way in
pressuring corporations to provide more robust social-responsibility disclosures. See
Williams & Conley, supra note 195, at 97–98.
197. However, it is also possible that certain pension funds will focus on issues that are not in
the best interests of employees. See Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in
Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 811–14 (1993) (discussing the
political pressure that often motivates the advocacy of public pension funds).
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undermines the proposition that shareholders will not take the interests of
stakeholders into account.198
The empirical evidence on this recent wave of shareholder activism
reveals that more traditional shareholders, such as institutional investors, are
actually working with social investors. Accordingly, proxy data in the United
States suggest that social proposals are drawing increased support from
institutional and traditional investors, because these more traditional investors
have begun to believe that focusing on particular stakeholder concerns,
including employees, consumers, and the larger community, inures to the
benefit of the entire corporation.199 Data both in the United States and
elsewhere reveal that social investors and traditional investors have joined
forces, and it is this collaboration that is responsible for many of the
successful shareholder votes.200 Moreover, this collaboration has blurred the
lines between governance and social issues: traditional investors have begun
to view social issues as important to shareholder value while social investors
have become increasingly concerned with traditional governance matters.201
Here, the recent data suggest that increased shareholder power has not caused
shareholders and stakeholders to be at odds. Instead, it has improved the fate
of both shareholders and stakeholders. In this regard, shareholder democracy
may enhance the interests of stakeholders, particularly because it may enhance
the ability of social investors to collaborate with other investors to advance
the concerns of all corporate constituents.

198. See id.
199. See Olubunmi Faleye & Emery Trahan, Is What’s Best for Employees Best for Shareholders? 1, 24
(2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=888180 (noting that the market appears to
value corporate concern for workers); Williams & Conley, supra note 195, at 78–79
(discussing trends that have altered society’s expectations regarding business).
200. Timothy Smith, Institutional and Social Investors Find Common Ground, J. INVESTING, Fall
2005, at 57 (noting that social and environmental issues have been integrated into
concerns of institutional investors, leading such investors to support proposals related to
these issues); see also 2006 PROXY SEASON REPORT, supra note 1, at 41 (noting that the
most recent proxy seasons were characterized by increased collaboration between
proponents of social responsibility issues and other investors); 2004 PROXY SEASON
REPORT, supra note 15, at 28 (noting that increased support for social proposals stems
from the greater support from corporate leaders who have come to view such proposals
as meriting the same attention as other aspects of corporate governance).
201. See Smith, supra note 200, at 1 (noting increased collaboration between traditional
shareholders and efforts by labor unions, religious investors, and socially responsible
investment companies, which have blurred the lines between social and governance
issues).
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CONCLUSION
Shareholders in the United States are becoming more active in asserting
and exercising their voting rights. A similar phenomenon is occurring in other
countries. By comparing the American experience with those of investors in
other nations, this Article provides international perspective for the ongoing
shareholder democracy debate in the United States.
As an initial matter, U.S. shareholders are not alone in their activism.
Instead, such activism has taken root in many other countries where
shareholders not only have sought to strengthen their voting power, but also
have taken a more active role in overseeing corporate governance affairs.
Shareholder activism and the push for greater democracy may also have
positive repercussions for shareholders. Indeed, studies in other countries
reveal that shareholder activism may positively influence share value and
earnings. To the extent that these results can be applied to shareholder efforts
in the United States, they raise the possibility that shareholder democracy can
achieve its goal of improving firm value. Other countries have experienced
success in altering corporate practices through increased shareholder
participation, which bodes well for shareholder engagement efforts in the
United States. Finally, shareholder democracy does not have to undermine
the interests of stakeholders. Instead, this Article illuminates reasons why
enhanced shareholder power may prove beneficial to all corporate
constituents.
Shareholder democracy is not a panacea for all of the corporation’s ills.
Under the right circumstances, however, it can have a positive influence on
corporate governance. Given the momentum that shareholder democracy
campaigns now enjoy both in the United States and abroad, the debate about
its desirability may now be of limited significance—such democracy, at least
in some form, appears to be a fait accompli. If this is true, then American
scholars would do well to investigate international experiences in shareholder
democracy for insights on how U.S. corporations can harness the benefits of
shareholder democracy, while minimizing its shortcomings.
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